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SIXTH CIRCUIT REVIEW 
United States v. Doggart: Does a House of Worship 
Affect Interstate Commerce? 
ANDRIA DORSTEN EBERT 
In United States v. Doggart, 947 F.3d 879 (6th Cir. 2020), the 
Sixth Circuit sought to answer two intertwined questions of law: Does a 
house of worship affect interstate commerce enough to invoke a federal 
arson charge, even though arson is a crime usually left to the States? In 
the spring of 2015, Robert Doggart planned an attack on a small Muslim 
community in the Catskills known as Islamberg. He was recruiting people 
online to carry out an armed attack on Islamberg’s mosque, which 
Doggart targeted specifically for its religious significance. He planned to 
burn it down or blow it up with a Molotov cocktail, and had little regard 
for any damage the explosion might cause, stating: “I don’t want to have 
to kill children, but there’s always collateral damage.” Simply put, the 
facts of the attempted crime are heinous. 
 Doggart’s planned attack was not the only one this small community 
has experienced in recent years. Islamberg was formed in the 1970s by a 
group of African-American Muslims seeking to raise their children in a 
serene, prayerful environment. Only about 40 Muslim families—around 
200 people total—call this 68-acre, privately-owned community home. 
United States v. Doggart, 906 F.3d 506, 506 (6th Cir. 2018). Yet despite 
the community’s religious solitude and close connections with its non-
Muslim neighbors, Islamberg is not a safe haven for its residents. In 
addition to Doggart’s planned 2015 attack, Islamberg has been the target 
of internet conspiracy theories and other attacks from people claiming 
that the community is a den of Islamic extremism.  
 Although some organizations called his plans acts of domestic 
terrorism, Doggart was not charged with terrorism. Instead, he was 
charged with solicitation to commit federal arson under 18 U.S.C. § 
844(i), raising the question at issue in the Sixth Circuit’s recent decision: 
Can Doggart be charged with “making a threat in interstate commerce” 
when the mosque’s ties to interstate commerce were attenuated? Doggart, 
947 F.3d at 883. According to the Sixth Circuit, he cannot. “The text of 
this criminal statute does not create a natural home for the attempted 
destruction of a mosque” and by “conventional measure, these terms do 
not cover the attempted destruction of a local mosque.” Id.  
 Here, because the mosque was created for local spiritual activity, it 
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would not be transformed into a building used in interstate commerce 
without something “more.” Id. at 885. This “something more” does not 
require the building be used for commercial purposes, but it must be 
actively involved in commercial purposes for § 844(i) to apply. Jones v. 
United States, 529 U.S. 848, 859 (2000). In this case, Islamberg argued 
it was involved in two commercial activities: a planned online bookstore 
and a summer camp collecting about $100–$150 per student. Doggart, 
947 F.3d at 885–87. But these de minimis interactions with commerce—
which may or not be interstate commerce—were not enough meet the 
Jones requirements and allow the § 844(i) charge against Doggart. Id.  
Even though the § 844(i) conviction was reversed, Doggart still 
could face 120 months in prison under 18 U.S.C. § 247(d)(3). Id. at 883. 
He will be re-sentenced based on this reversal. Id. 
 But can a house of worship ever be involved in interstate commerce? 
As Judge Jeffrey Sutton quipped in his opinion, “[T]he buildings are often 
insured. (Faith goes so far.) A house of worship must comply with 
governmental building and safety codes that apply to commercial 
buildings. (Give to Caesar what is Caesar’s.) The faith community … 
pays the individuals who work in the buildings. (Even servants of God 
have bills to pay.)” Id. at 884–85. Churches can, and do, engage in some 
forms of commerce. But “without more,” they do not meet the Jones test 
for being involved in interstate commerce. Doggart, 947 F.3d at 885.  
However, Doggart raised a question more fundamental than the 
commerce question: should the federal justice system have been involved 
in the first place? After all, arson is a crime traditionally left to the states 
to prosecute. Id. at 883. But by cabining the arson statute’s reach only to 
buildings “used in” interstate commerce, Congress signaled its intent to 
regulate less than it might otherwise have the power to do. Id. (quoting 
Jones, 529 U.S. at 854–55). Without that limitation, Congress might have 
created a statute that could transform almost every arson into a federal 
offense. Id. 
Even so, the “used in interstate commerce” limitation does little 
to clarify the point at which a state arson could become a federal charge 
under § 844(i). Perhaps, with slightly different factual circumstances, the 
mosque in Islamberg might be considered to affect interstate commerce. 
After all, it sits only ten miles from the Pennsylvania border and has 
attracted people from Tennessee and Arizona to plan attacks.  
 
 
